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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between political discussion on Facebook and social 
network location. It uses a survey name generator to map friendship ties between students at a 
university and to calculate their centralities in that network. Social connectedness in the 
university network positively predicts more frequent political discussion on Facebook. But in 
political discussions better connected individuals do not capitalize equally on the potential 
influence that stems from their more central network locations. Popular individuals who have 
more direct connections to other network members discuss politics more often but in politically 
safer interactions that minimize social risk, preferring more engaged discussion with like-minded 
others and editing their privacy settings to guard their political disclosures. Gate-keepers who 
facilitate connections between more pairs of otherwise disconnected network members also 
discuss politics more frequently, but are more likely to engage in risk-tolerant discussion 




practices like posting political updates or attempting political persuasion. These novel findings 
on social connectedness extend research on offline political discussion into the social media 
sphere, and suggest that as social network research proliferates, analysts should consider how 
various types of network location shape political behavior.   
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 Informal political discussion is central to the marketplace of ideas and the democratic 
process (Mutz 2006). A growing literature examines the role of social networks in political 
discussion (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Morey et al. 2012; Moy and Gastil 2006; Valenzuela 
et al. 2012), but questions about how network roles and context affect those discussions remain 
unaddressed. That research shows, for example, that individuals with more social connections 
discuss politics more often, but it is unclear if this is equally true of different types of network 
locations, and how those relationships between network location and political discussion might 
manifest in various discussion venues. It is also understood that individuals who are located 
more centrally in a social network can influence more network members while those who are not 
as central have less structural influence (Borgatti et al. 2013; Prell 2012). It is not clear, however, 
whether or not individuals discuss politics in ways that capitalize on their network-based 
potential to influence others. 
This study examines the extent to which political discussion relates to individuals’ 
network locations, addressing effects on both discussion frequency and discussion practices. In 
the data analysis, we first calculate individuals’ centralities in an offline friendship network of 
college students. Since social media increasingly facilitate political discussion and offer 
numerous communication options (Fernandes et al. 2010; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Vitak et al. 




2011), we then examine these students’ political discussion practices in the context of Facebook. 
We show that two variants of social network location—indegree centrality and betweenness 
centrality—positively predict political discussion frequency, but matter differently for how 
individuals engage in political discussion. Though both types of centrality endow individuals 
with greater potential for exerting political influence, indegree centrality predicts more risk 
averse discussion practices whereas betweenness centrality predicts more risk-tolerant practices.  
Social Networks and Political Discussion 
 While a sizeable literature examines how the social networks around individuals relate to 
political discussion, studies have not yet accounted fully for how social network locations relate 
to political discussion. Research shows that social networks contextualize the role of personality 
and demographics in political discussion (Hibbing et al. 2011), and that network size, tie 
strength, and network heterogeneity are important correlates of political discussion. Specifically, 
political discussion network size relates positively to discussion frequency (Moy and Gastil 
2006). This association replicates online: the more people individuals talk with online, the more 
they engage in technology-mediated political acts such as emailing politicians and posting on 
political blogs (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Valenzuela et al. 2012). Individuals tend to discuss 
politics and express political disagreement with strong-tie rather than weak-tie alters, although 
political discussion can take place with both (Morey et al. 2012). And heterogeneous discussion 
networks—typically measured in terms of demographic or political diversity—are often 
associated with greater political mobilization offline and online (Eveland and Hively 2009).  
Within this literature, the relationship between network location and political discussion 
remains under-examined because studies typically use the egocentric approach to measure social 
networks (e.g., Eveland et al. 2013; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Mondak et 




al. 2010; Morey et al. 2012; Mutz 2006). This is a useful strategy for testing theories focused on 
direct social ties because it assesses only the immediate networks that surround isolated 
individuals (i.e., egos). By deemphasizing the indirect ties that connect egos into a broader social 
network, the egocentric approach does not allow for the analysis of location within a larger 
network (Marin and Wellman 2011). The whole-network approach, in contrast, maps both direct 
and indirect ties between multiple egos in a single network. This allows analysts to understand 
how individuals fit into the web of social connections that surround them. For example, a whole-
network approach shows how well connected certain individuals are in comparison to others in a 
community or to what extent they link disparate clusters of network members.  
The present research focuses on the relationship between political discussion and two 
variants of network location, that is, network centrality. Centrality is used to understand not only 
locations in network structures but also how these locations privilege some members with 
potential social influence while disadvantaging others (Borgatti et al. 2013; Freeman, 1979; Prell 
2012). Indegree centrality reflects the size of an individual’s network of direct connections. 
Analysts commonly treat it as representing individual popularity and capacity for direct personal 
influence in a network. Betweenness centrality indicates how much an individual brokers the 
shortest path between two other network members, meaning, to what degree an individual 
connects the otherwise disconnected. Betweenness centrality is commonly understood in social 
network research as the ability to be an influential gatekeeper between individuals who cannot 
directly influence each other. In this research we examine how these two types of network 
locations differentiate political discussion practices.  
While centrality stems from individual attributes and the behaviors they dictate (Marin 
and Wellman 2011), it also can shape communication practices. The finite set of actions and 




scripts in which individuals habitually engage as they interact and communicate with others 
shapes and maintains their network locations. But network centrality is not simply a stand-in for 
its demographic, psychological, or behavioral correlates; rather, centrality denotes a unique 
structural capacity to influence by virtue of where one is located in a network (Klein et al. 2004). 
Those higher in indegree centrality have greater potential to influence because they have more 
direct social ties. Those higher in betweenness centrality have a greater capacity for influence 
because they straddle structural holes in networks, that is, spaces that lack a direct tie between 
two alters (Borgatti et al. 2013; Prell 2012). 
We may expect centrally located individuals to engage in political discussions in ways 
that capitalize on their influential network locations. Compared across isolated egocentric 
networks, individuals with more social links and more heterogeneous links have more frequent 
political discussions, presumably because of their central, hub-like network positions (Eveland et 
al. 2013). It is unclear, however, if the same is true for individuals who are central relative to 
other members of their networks. It is possible that when the larger context of a network is taken 
into account via a whole-network perspective, the more central members of a network do not 
always take the lead in discussing politics and influencing others. It may be that different types 
of network centrality relate individuals to political discussion in divergent ways. 
Specifically, individuals with high indegree or betweenness centrality may not discuss 
politics in a manner consistent with their influential network positions because maintaining high 
centrality involves managing social risk. Since politics can be divisive and talking politics is 
risky in settings that comingle those of disparate political orientations (Mutz 2006), individuals 
with high indegree centrality may engage in political discussions differently than those with high 
betweenness centrality. High indegree centrality requires wide social approval and popularity 




(Borgatti et al. 2013; Prell 2012), and may favor low-risk communication practices. Achieving 
and maintaining high indegree centrality demands being outgoing and engaged, but that 
prominence imposes social constraints like greater pressure to adhere to social norms to preserve 
one’s status (Valente and Fujimoto 2010). Given the potential divisiveness of politics, those who 
disclose political preferences are more likely to fragment their social networks than those whose 
politics are private. Thus, those with high indegree centrality may retain extensive network 
connections by being sociable while avoiding political divisiveness. 
Meanwhile, individuals with high betweenness centrality connect otherwise unconnected 
or less directly connected network members. They act as gatekeepers by bridging those gaps, 
exerting influence over information flows in the network (Borgatti et al. 2013; Prell 2012). 
Linked to a diverse subset of network members, those with higher betweenness centrality may be 
accustomed to negotiating disparate views within their networks, and they may be more tolerant 
of socially risky communication practices. They also may have a greater false sense of consensus 
in the network (Flynn and Wiltermuth 2010). In all, they may be less concerned than other 
network members about the social ramifications of engaging in political discussion. 
In sum, individuals with high indegree centrality or high betweenness centrality may not 
approach political discussions in the same manner and thus capitalize equally on their influential 
network locations. Though both types of individuals may engage in political discussion more 
often than less well connected persons, those high in indegree centrality may be less likely to 
embrace the social risk inherent in those discussions whereas those high in betweenness 
centrality may be more tolerant of that risk. We consider next the associations between these 
centrality variants and political discussion practices on Facebook.  
Political Discussion Practices on Facebook 




Offline-online connection. Individuals’ general offline political discussion tendencies 
likely correspond to their political discussion tendencies on Facebook because Facebook 
relationships and behaviors replicate and extend non-Facebook relationships and behaviors. 
Although Facebook connects users with both strong- and weak-tie alters, users interact the most 
with their closest offline friends, their strongest ties (Jones et al. 2013). The social networks 
individuals construct on Facebook reflect the breadth and diversity of users’ offline networks 
(Birnbaum 2013; Hogan 2010; Litt 2013; Mehdizadeh 2010; Pempek et al. 2009; Reich et al. 
2010; Robinson 2007). Young adults especially use social networking sites like Facebook as 
supplemental tools for communicating with offline social ties (Jones et al. 2013; Mehdizadeh 
2010; Reich et al. 2010; Subrahmanyam and Smahel 2011; Vitak et al. 2011). 
Growing evidence shows that users’ Facebook communication behaviors reflect their 
offline communication tendencies. These communication habits include information disclosure 
(Sheldon 2013) and political engagement (Macafee and De Simone 2012; Vitak et al. 2011). In 
general, individuals avoid creating online personas that are substantially different from their 
offline selves because they treat social media platforms as reflections and extensions of their 
offline selves (Birnbaum 2013; Grasmuck et al. 2009; Hogan 2010; Litt 2013; Pempek et al. 
2009; Reich et al. 2010; Robinson 2007). In line with this literature, we suggest that individuals’ 
locations in their college friendship network extend into their Facebook conduct and are reflected 
in their political discussion practices on Facebook. 
Discussion-stimulating practices. In addition to a conventional measure of political 
discussion frequency, we focus on two sets of Facebook-specific political conversation 
practices—discussion-stimulating practices and response practices—that may relate to users’ 
network centralities. The first of these reflects common strategies for negotiating boundaries of 




shared information in networks, including “granting access and making disclosures,” “selective 
access and disclosure,” and “withdrawing and withholding” (Parks 2011, 373). Facebook users 
can stimulate discussion with political self-disclosure in status updates or by “liking” political 
pages. Both actions broadcast users’ political preferences to their friends’ newsfeeds. 
Because disclosure is more likely when individuals anticipate supportive responses 
(Wyatt et al. 2000), uncertainty about others’ politics increases disclosure-related risk. Facebook 
users may prefer to engage in safe disclosure, which involves limiting political talk to friends 
whose politics are either known or consonant. Users also can employ targeted disclosure to 
increase disclosure support and minimize social risk by tailoring their privacy settings to block 
individual friends or subgroups of friends from viewing their political information.   
 Facebook users also can attempt to persuade their online friends. Attempted persuasion is 
more socially risky than self-disclosure as it suggests that others’ opinions are undesirable, 
creates oppositional and potentially unfriendly situations, and can make the target of attempted 
persuasion feel unwanted social pressure (Dillard and Knobloch 2011). Online political 
persuasion, however, is used infrequently (Vitak et al. 2011). 
 How does network centrality relate to these discussion-stimulating practices? As 
discussed, having more friends requires broader popularity and social approval. Accordingly, 
individuals with high indegree centrality likely engage in practices that yield a large number of 
social ties while minimizing social risks that might harm those connections. We expect that those 
high in indegree centrality (H1a) will discuss politics more frequently on Facebook than those 
with low indegree centrality, given that larger personal networks positively relate to political 
discussion frequency (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Moy and Gastil 2006; Valenzuela et al. 2012). 
However, we expect that to reduce social risk in those discussions, higher indegree centrality 




individuals will be more concerned about managing boundaries around their political disclosures. 
Thus, they will be less likely to (H2a) disclose political information on Facebook in ways that 
are more visible to their broader friendship networks, and more likely to prefer and engage in 
(H3a) safe disclosure and (H4a) targeted disclosure. They also will be more concerned about 
being offensive, and thus (H5a) less likely to attempt political persuasion. 
 Concern about risk in political discussion may not be as pressing for high betweenness 
centrality individuals. As discussed, they are used to gate-keeping structural holes between 
diverse and unconnected alters, and so may be more tolerant of social risk. Thus, we expect that 
those high in betweenness (H1b) discuss politics more frequently than those low in betweenness, 
and (H2b) are more likely to make political disclosures. They will also prefer and engage in 
(H3b) less safe disclosure and (H4b) targeted disclosure. And by brokering relationships, those 
with high betweenness will be more likely to present new information to those they connect and 
to convince them of its accuracy. Thus, (H5b) they will be more likely to attempt persuasion.  
 Discussion response practices. Rusbult (1987) identified four strategies for dealing with 
dissatisfaction in relationships: voice, loyalty, neglect, and exit. Facebook options for responding 
to political disclosure parallel these ideal types, and this typology may be applied to both 
agreeable and disagreeable communication. Voice and loyalty represent constructive practices 
(Rusbult 1987) that either continue political discussion or at least do not halt it. Facebook users 
can agree or disagree with a friend’s political opinion by posting a reply, thus allowing continued 
political conversation. Short of publicly voicing their positions, Facebook users also may 
practice loyalty to friends by following their links or by examining causes promoted by them.  
Neglect and exit reflect conversationally destructive practices. Users may stop a friend’s 
attempt at political discussion and mute the online relationship by hiding the friend’s updates 




from appearing in their own newsfeeds. Users also may exit the relationship by unfriending, 
which means removing an individual from one’s friend list. Facebook users consider blocking 
and unfriending to be viable responses to Facebook statements that violate perceived standards 
of politeness, with blocking being appropriate for less severe violations than unfriending (Peña 
and Brody 2014). Users may engage in both constructive and destructive responses to 
increasingly connect with those who are politically consonant (Bello and Rolfe 2014).  
Individuals in prominent network positions likely behave in ways that maintain these 
positions. Those higher in indegree centrality are likely to sustain their relationships and their 
prominent positions. Those higher in betweenness centrality also behave in ways that preserve a 
large and diverse network of connections. Thus, we expect that both (H6a) indegree and (H6b) 
betweenness centrality will be positively related to constructive Facebook responses. Conversely, 
as destructive responses harm network connections, (H7a) indegree and (H7b) betweenness 
centrality will be negatively related to destructive political discussion practices on Facebook.   
Methods 
Data 
 In 2010 we surveyed 5,726 students at The College of William & Mary, a medium-sized 
public US university, about their social ties to other students, politics, and Facebook use. All 
students on the college master email list were sent invitations with links to a web-based survey. 
Reminders were sent every 2-3 days for two weeks using varied participation appeals. As a 
response incentive, participants were eligible for a drawing for one of fifty $10 gift cards. We 
then targeted nonrespondents1 by shortening the survey to network tie measures and 
demographics. The participation rate was 50.51%.2  
To map the student network, a name generator asked for the “names of up to five of your 




closest friends who attend” the university. This language is common in name generators used to 
construct general friendship networks made up of generic strong friend ties (Marsden 2011). In 
pretest focus groups and cognitive interviews we conducted, subjects consistently interpreted 
“closest friends” to mean “best friends.” Respondents were not asked to think specifically about 
offline or online communication in reporting their closest friends. 
Name generators are the standard tool for measuring network links in surveys, and have 
been included in the ANES, the GSS, the Framingham Heart Study, and Add Health, among 
others. Most past work on political discussion in networks is based on name generator data (e.g. 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; McClurg 2003; Mutz 2006; Sokhey and 
Djupe 2013). An objection to name generators is that they truncate network ties (Eveland et al. 
2013), but capping respondents at five names is typical, especially when measuring ties in large 
networks (Marsden 2011). Indeed, limiting generators to just three names is common in such 
research. Because the average American using an uncapped name generator names between two 
and five close friends (Brashears 2011), caps such as ours are appropriate for measuring close 
friend networks.  
Alternatives to capped name generators are impractical in large networks like ours (i.e., N 
> 5,000). Although students can be asked to rate their relationship with every network member 
using an exhaustive list, or be given an uncapped name generator (Eveland et al. 2013), in large 
networks both approaches are susceptible to respondent fatigue. Additionally, some respondents 
may satisfice unlimited name generators by listing just a few close ties while others meticulously 
list even mere acquaintances. This can yield inequivalent networks that analysts nonetheless 
would treat as equally representing the universes of close alters. Thus, a three-to-five name limit 
ensures a standardized set of “close friends” across respondents.   




The name generator yielded a dominant friendship cluster comprising 86.94% of the 
university’s students. An additional 7.43% of the students were in several dozen substantially 
smaller clusters. As is typical in social network analysis, we calculated centrality scores for 
individuals in the dominant cluster. We then assessed the relationships between these centrality 
scores and political communication practices on Facebook. Given the research cited above on 
social media networks mimicking offline friendship networks, we felt confident that the name 
generator data provided leverage over our respondents’ Facebook dynamics.  
Measures 
Centrality. Name generator links were used to quantify centrality scores of students in the 
largest network cluster. Indegree centrality was measured as the total number of alters that 
named each ego as a friend [bounded 0 to (N-1); M=4.67, SD=2.80], reasonably proxying 
network popularity since higher scores require having other network members naming one as a 
friend. Betweenness centrality represented how much respondents connected otherwise directly 
unconnected individuals (standardized 0–13, based on undirected ties; M=.002, SD=.0044; see 
Prell 2012 for calculation details). Indegree and betweenness centrality correlated at a moderate 
.45, showing these to be distinct concepts that may relate to unique behavior patterns.5 
The longer survey version containing Facebook behavior items was not completed by all 
respondents; some respondents only answered the network and demographic items in the shorter 
survey. The following dependent variables are based on responses from 22.83% (N = 1,307) of 
the university’s students, those who completed the longer survey.  
Political Discussion (H1a/b). Respondents indicated their frequency of discussing 
politics publicly on Facebook (1 = “never” … 5 = “very often”). They were cued to report public 
displays that may generate discussions on the site, such as status updates or posted links. See the 




supplemental appendix for wording, coding, and descriptive statistics for all survey questions. 
Self-Disclosure (H2a/b). Three types of political disclosures were dichotomously 
assessed: liking the official campaign page of a candidate in a recent local election, completing 
the “political views” field of one’s Facebook profile, and posting status updates about politics. 
Safe Disclosure (H3a/b). Those who reported discussing politics publicly on Facebook at 
least “occasionally” were asked about typical discussion partners in those exchanges. First, we 
assessed closeness of partners, including “just family and close friends,” “any friends or 
acquaintances,” and “anyone, including people I do not know.” Second, we assessed partner 
opinion, including people who “generally agree with me,” “I don’t distinguish,” and people who 
“generally disagree with me.” Respondents also ranked their comfort level discussing politics 
with those they disagreed with and then those whose opinions they did not know. 
Targeted Disclosure (H4a/b). Two dichotomous items assessed whether respondents 
engaged in blocking behaviors to prevent certain Facebook friends from seeing political content 
in their profiles: blocking specific friends from seeing parts of one’s profile (e.g. liked pages, 
“About” section) and blocking specific friends from seeing status updates. 
Attempted Persuasion (H5a/b). Two dichotomous items assessed persuasive practices. 
First, respondents who reported liking political Facebook pages were presented with a checklist 
of possible reasons they liked those pages. Our interest was in one reason: “to influence the 
opinions of friends.” Second, respondents reported whether they posted an Election Day GOTV 
message on Facebook supporting a candidate in a recent local election. 
 Constructive Responses (H6a/b). Three constructive responses to disclosures were 
assessed. Students reported a typical reaction to a friend’s political status update, regardless of 
whether they agree with the content of the update, including: skip it, read it, and both read it and 




then either comment on it or like it. They indicated a typical reaction when friends post political 
news or links, regardless of whether they agree with the content of those links, including: skip 
over it, read it quickly without usually following the link, and both read it and usually follow the 
link. They also reported if they have visited the Facebook page of a “candidate, group, cause, or 
something else political” because they saw that a friend had liked it on Facebook.      
 Destructive Responses (H7a/b). Destructive responses were measured with four 
dichotomous items: hiding someone’s status updates for posting too much about politics, hiding 
someone’s updates for posting political views contrary to the respondent’s views, unfriending 
someone for posting too much about politics, and unfriending someone for posting political 
views contrary to the respondent’s views.  
Controls. All models controlled for academic year to proxy the limited variance of age 
and years of education, economic status, sex, race, frequency of Facebook use, general political 
interest, turnout propensity, partisanship, partisan strength, ideology, and ideological strength. 
Per Mondak et al.’s treatment of personality and political behavior (2010), models included 
conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness measured via the Ten-Item Personality Inventory. 
Results 
Political Discussion Frequency 
 Table 1 reports frequencies for the political discussion practices measured in this study. 
Although our sample is a case study of one network, its discussion frequencies do not differ in a 
consistent direction from similar self-reports by general population samples in Pew studies 
(Rainie and Smith 2012; Smith 2011). Compared to Pew data, our participants engaged in 
discussion practices either at lower (e.g. liking candidate pages, posting GOTV messages) or 
similar rates (e.g. blocking/unfriending over politics, commenting on others’ political updates). 




Only for posting political updates did our participants report a higher rate than Pew’s general 
population sample. It is impossible to infer whether differences in these rates stemmed from 
college network peculiarities or question wording differences between this study and the Pew 
surveys. In all, no clear bias is evident in this network’s political discussion frequencies.  
 We predicted that indegree (H1a) and betweenness (H1b) centrality would relate 
positively to political discussion frequency on Facebook. Table 2 models discussion frequency as 
a function of the centralities and the control variables. Both centrality variants predicted greater 
frequency. Thus, the more friends one had in the network or the more one connected disparate 
individuals, the more often one talked about politics on Facebook. Moving from ±1SD on 
indegree centrality (roughly 2 to 8 friends) increased the total probability of discussing politics 
on Facebook at least “occasionally” by 17.39 points (23.73% to 41.12%), all other predictors at 
their means. A similar shift in betweenness yielded an increase of 13.88 points (26.09% to 
39.97%). Social connectedness generally, then, was tied to more frequent use of social media for 
political talk, supporting H1a and H1b.  
[Table 2] 
Partisanship and ideology were largely insignificant predictors in the models across our 
analysis. Their interactions with both indegree and betweenness centrality were also consistently 
insignificant and excluded from the final models. Thus, the centrality relationships reported here 
were not conditional on political predispositions, nor did those predispositions differentiate 
discussion practices. And though other controls reached statistical significance in certain models, 
we focus our analysis on the centrality variants as they are the core of our theory. 
Practices that Stimulate Political Discussion 
 Despite their similar association with political discussion frequency, the two centrality 




variants did not correspond to the same political discussion practices. We expected higher 
indegree centrality to be associated with risk-averse practices but higher betweenness centrality 
to predict greater acceptance of social risk. We tested the effect of centrality on four sets of 
practices that could stimulate political discussion on Facebook: self-disclosure (H2a/b), safe 
disclosure with close or politically consonant partners (H3a/b), targeted disclosure through 
blocking (H4a/b), and attempted persuasion (H5a/b). Table 3 models these communication 
practices as a function of centrality and control variables. 
[Table 3] 
 Table 4 gives predicted probabilities of discussion practices for models in which indegree 
or betweenness centrality were significant. These were calculated at ±1SD from the mean of each 
measure, with the total probability change for each 2SD shift shown in the last column.  
[Table 4] 
Self-disclosures were some of the most common political activities students engaged in 
on Facebook. While only 6.48% liked the campaign page of a local election candidate, about 
40% listed their political views and nearly 60% posted political status updates. Betweenness 
centrality consistently predicted making disclosures, with associated probability changes ranging 
from 9% to 41% for a 2SD increase in this centrality. This supported H2b. We also posited that 
higher indegree centrality would predict a decreased likelihood of self-disclosure (H2a). This 
was true only for liking campaign pages. It was also the only discussion practice for which 
indegree and betweenness centrality worked significantly against one another. The typical 
pattern, instead, was for one centrality variant to be significant in the expected direction and for 
the other variant to be “correctly” signed per our hypotheses but statistically insignificant. Thus, 
even though indegree and betweenness centrality did not generally pull respondents in different 




directions on the same discussion practices as we posited, their effects did support our general 
hypothesized pattern of indegree centrality relating to risk aversion in political discussion and 
betweenness centrality relating to risk acceptance. 
Though the data did not fully support H2a, further results supported the idea that indegree 
centrality was tied to socially safer discussion practices. Higher indegree centrality respondents 
were less comfortable with risky political discussions. Compared to those at −1SD indegree 
centrality, respondents at +1SD were 24.87% more likely to feel uncomfortable talking about 
politics publicly on Facebook with those whose political views they did not know, and 17.68% 
more likely to feel this way about talking with those with whom they disagreed (total respective 
probabilities of 56.68% and 48.40%). Betweenness was unrelated to discomfort, suggesting less 
psychological impetus for high-betweenness respondents to censor their public online discussion.  
For conversation partner selection, respondents at +1SD indegree centrality had a 66.47% 
chance of discussing politics only with family and close friends and a 53.84% likelihood of 
discussing primarily with others who agreed with them politically. These probabilities were 
about 20% higher than those of respondents at −1SD on indegree centrality. This supported our 
expectation about safe disclosure in H3a. Although the expected negative relationship for 
betweenness in H3b was not supported, the lack of a significant association did differentiate 
indegree and betweenness centrality in the context of safe discussion. 
Targeting political disclosures was not the norm among respondents, as only 14.72% 
blocked friends from sections of their profiles and 26.92% blocked specific updates. Comparing 
respondents on indegree centrality, those at +1SD were about 20% more likely to block friends 
from seeing both specific sections of their profiles and specific status updates because of political 
considerations than those at −1SD. Figure 1A illustrates these indegree centrality effects as an 




example of the centrality relationships in Table 4. These results supported the tailored disclosure 
hypothesis for indegree centrality (H4a), but not the negative expectation for betweenness (H4b). 
[Figure 1] 
Attempted persuasion was positively tied to betweenness centrality, reflecting a greater 
acceptance of risk and supporting H5b. Students with higher betweenness scores were more 
likely to say that they liked Facebook pages as a means to influence others. Those at +1SD on 
betweenness were 16.21% more likely to select this as a reason for liking pages than those at       
−1SD. Betweenness had no relationship to other reasons for liking political pages: learning about 
candidates or groups, getting political news, or “showing support, regardless of whether my 
friends pay attention or not.” Betweenness was also positively related to posting a GOTV status 
update. Figure 1B illustrates these betweenness centrality effects. In contrast, indegree centrality 
had no relationship to either indicator of attempted persuasion. H5a was not supported.  
Political Discussion Response Practices  
 We expected indegree and betweenness centrality to be related similarly to response 
practices (H6a/b-H7a/b). Table 5 presents models testing this expectation, predicting discussion 
response practices as a function of centrality and the control variables.  
[Table 5] 
H6a was supported but H6b was not. Indegree centrality was a consistent positive 
predictor of constructive responses.6 Comparing respondents at ±1SD indegree centrality, there 
was a 17.01% difference in the predicted probability of reading and either commenting on or 
liking a friend’s political post. The comparable differences were roughly 15% for visiting a 
political Facebook page because a friend liked it, and for reading and clicking on a friend’s 
political link. When they chose to engage with others’ political disclosures, those with more 




friends were more likely to respond in ways demonstrating engagement with the content of those 
disclosures. Betweenness centrality, however, was not related to constructive responses.  
Students practiced destructive responses infrequently. Only 26.42% reported unfriending 
someone because of political disagreement, and the other destructive behaviors were less 
frequent. Hypotheses about these destructive responses (H7a/b) were borne out, as shown in 
Table 5. Those higher in indegree or betweenness centrality were less likely than others to pursue 
these response tactics and shut down further political discussion. Though the predicted 
probability differences comparing those at ±1SD were only about 15 points, proportion-wise 
these represented substantial shifts given the infrequent occurrence of these actions. 
Egocentric Networks and Political Engagement 
Finally, to relate our sample to the findings of prior political discussion studies, we 
examined egocentric network size, heterogeneity, and political engagement as a function of 
network centrality. We used the self-reported number of Facebook friends as a proxy of online 
egocentric network size.7 Respondents at +1SD on indegree centrality had 92 more Facebook 
friends than those at −1SD, controlling for our remaining predictors. Those at +1SD on 
betweenness had 61 more friends than those at −1SD.  
To approximate political heterogeneity in respondents’ egocentric networks, we used the 
self-reported partisanship and ideology of respondents’ linked friends from the name generator. 
Students at +1SD on each centrality variant were roughly 25% more likely to have immediate 
offline friend groups consisting of both Democrats and Republicans than those at −1SD. 
Likewise, those at +1SD on either centrality variant were roughly 30% more likely to have 
immediate offline friend networks consisting of both self-identified liberals and conservatives 
than those at −1SD. On political engagement, respondents at +1SD on indegree and betweenness 




centrality were respectively 29.45% and 23.03% more likely to have voted in at least one 
election than those at −1SD. Together, these patterns suggest that higher-centrality respondents 
fit the mold of those who, in past studies, are more likely to discuss politics: they have relatively 
large and politically heterogeneous friend networks, and they are more politically engaged.  
Discussion 
 This study addresses an underexplored attribute of political discussion in the context of a 
social network. Namely, it uses a whole-network approach to assess how communication about 
politics relates to social network location. Because social media like Facebook constitute venues 
for political discussion and offer myriad communication options (e.g., status updates, blocking), 
the study documents how these tools are used to communicate about politics. It examines effects 
on political discussion frequency, communication habits as they related to how more centrally 
located individuals in networks capitalize on their inherent potential to politically influence 
others, and communication practices in two categories: practices generating political discussion 
and those responding to political disclosure.  Table 6 summarizes these findings. 
[Table 6] 
Individuals who are better connected to other network members discuss politics on 
Facebook more frequently, but the type of central location they occupy in the network shapes 
how they approach those conversations. Those with higher indegree centrality talk about politics 
on Facebook more often than those with fewer ties; however, they appear more risk-averse in 
their political discussions, managing those conversations to preserve their broader network 
popularity rather than exploit their potential to influence others directly. They prefer close or 
likeminded discussion partners and tailor the audiences of their political disclosures. Since these 
individuals’ immediate links are more politically diverse, segmenting discussion partners may be 




a logical strategy for navigating this diversity, minimizing their reported discomfort with the 
social risks of political discussion but still enabling them to still discuss politics more than less 
central individuals. Further, when friends post something political, those higher in indegree 
centrality engage with the content by reading it, commenting on it, or following links. This 
greater engagement and their tendency not to hide or unfriend friends over politics likely 
contribute to these individuals’ more central network locations.  
Those higher in betweenness centrality—individuals whose gatekeeping role in a network 
likely accustoms them to navigating divides between diverse and disconnected clusters of 
network members—also are unlikely to sever connections because of politics. Such behavior 
would be antithetical to their central locations. They are more likely to discuss politics on 
Facebook than those lower in betweenness, but are also more likely to engage in socially risky 
discussion practices: disclosing political views, endorsing candidates, and attempting political 
persuasion by liking political pages or posting GOTV messages. Individuals with higher 
betweenness centrality straddle network clusters and are surrounded by more politically diverse 
network members than their less central counterparts. Social media, which consolidates 
politically disparate network members in one place, may be an ideal tool for these more risk-
accepting individuals to engage in opinion leadership and political influence.   
 These findings add a novel angle to how we understand the role of network location in 
political discussion. Social connectedness in a network promotes political engagement, in this 
case political discussion on Facebook. But centrality also denotes the potential to influence 
others in a network, and social network literature typically assumes that individuals—either as a 
conscious strategic choice or out of unconscious habit—capitalize on whatever structural 
influence they have in networks. Our research suggests that this is not always the case. Those 




higher in indegree centrality appear reluctant to fully exercise their political potential, preferring 
safer interactions that preserve their popularity but truncate their political sway. Those higher in 
betweenness, being more accustomed to navigating diverse structural holes, are more willing to 
act in ways that can influence their connections. These patterns reflect the tenet that individuals 
follow scripts and habits that maintain their network locations. Our findings suggest that these 
habits extend to political discussion practices in social media, with offline network locations 
shaping and being shaped by how individuals negotiate online political discussion’s social risks.  
 This study adds complexity to our understanding of how network size relates to political 
engagement. Past studies showed that those with larger egocentric networks are more politically 
engaged (Lake and Huckfeldt 1998) and discuss politics more often (Moy and Gastil 2006). Our 
work implies that the link between personal network size and discussion may depend on strategic 
management of political discussion boundaries. Those who discuss politics often and who are 
more politically engaged might maintain large networks only if they tightly control how and with 
whom they discuss politics. The most politically engaged, then, may not be the ones with the 
most network connections. They may be surpassed in network ties by those who moderate their 
political openness. Admittedly, the network size measure in past studies only approximates 
indegree centrality, so future work should compare how these two measures relate to discussion 
practices. Likewise, future research also may test whether safe and targeted political disclosure 
mediate the links between network size, discussion frequency, and political participation.  
 Past research also showed that heterogeneous networks predict greater political 
knowledge and participation (Moy and Gastil 2006; Valenzuela et al. 2012). This study shifted 
the focus from heterogeneity to the influential role of individuals with high betweenness 
centrality. They appear disinclined to remain neutral; they are more likely to disclose political 




information and attempt persuasion. If those high in betweenness also are more politically 
knowledgeable and engaged, their communication practices may facilitate that knowledge and 
participation. Articulating opinions to potentially non-receptive audiences or persuading others 
of specific positions may be how these individuals gain political knowledge and engagement.  
 Our work also sheds light on the politically motivated social media practices of blocking, 
hiding, and unfriending. Respondents engaged in these practices infrequently. Blocking friends 
from seeing one’s political information was practiced more by those high in indegree centrality. 
Hiding and unfriending were characteristic of those with low indegree or low betweenness 
centrality. These practices, then, tend to be performed by those with fewer connections or those 
surrounded by denser, more homogeneous network clusters. These socially destructive responses 
can serve to further isolate their practitioners from more prominent network positions.  
 It is unclear to what extent Facebook-specific habits drove our results. No exact 
equivalents to status updates or blocking exist in face-to-face conversation, although in offline 
discussion people do make and censor political self-disclosures. But online discussions are often 
asynchronous, allowing greater flexibility for articulating positions and responses. Facebook also 
does not easily convey tone or physical cues that supply context in face-to-face talk. That lack of 
cues may encourage risk-averse behaviors among high indegree centrality respondents. These 
individuals may be more comfortable engaging in riskier discussion practices face-to-face. This 
proposition begs further research comparing online and offline political discussion dynamics. 
Our study’s limitations suggest avenues for future work. First, our research approach 
relied on research results that show online and offline networks and personas to overlap 
substantially. Future studies may find more nuanced relationships between network locations and 
political discussions by exploring political discussion in actual Facebook networks. Second, our 




study should invite replication work in divergent contexts. The whole-network approach 
necessitates convenience sampling of one network context. Thus, our study only speaks to 
political discussion in one specific general friendship network, not one that is explicitly political 
or whose culture alters the risk of political discussion. Network studies may be best thought of as 
case studies in which networks are selected for similarities and differences across contexts. Only 
replication can assess the generalizability of the patterns reported here.   
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Table 1. Frequency of Political Behaviors on Facebook (N = 1307) 
Communication Practice Percent 




Fairly Often 8.51 
Very often 1.23 
Self-Disclosure  
Like Candidate Page 6.48 
Post Political Views 43.78 
Post Political Updates 57.62 
Safe Disclosure1  
Partner Closeness  
Mainly family and close friends 66.05 
Any friends or acquaintances 27.11 
Anyone, including people I do not 
know 
6.84 
Partner Opinions  
Generally agree with me 47.75 
I don’t distinguish 42.25 
Generally disagree with me 10.00 
Targeted Disclosure  
Block Parts of Profile 14.72 
Block Certain Updates2 26.92 
Attempts at Persuasion  
Like Pages to Influence 33.76 
Post GOTV Message 8.99 
Constructive Responses  
Update Reaction  
Skip it 14.69 
Read it 46.12 
Read and either comment or like 39.18 
Link Reaction  
Skip it 16.08 
Read it 71.67 
Read and click on to follow 12.25 
Visit Page 50.66 
Destructive Responses  
Hide: Volume 18.87 
Hide: Disagree 26.42 
Unfriend: Volume 21.68 
Unfriend: Disagree 15.25 
                                                          
1 Safe disclosure items were only asked of respondents who reported publicly discussing politics on Facebook at 
least “occasionally” (N = 428). 
2 This question was only asked to respondents who reported that they posted status updates about politics (N = 753). 




Table 2. Frequency of Political Discussion on Facebook 
Indegree Centrality .05* 
(.02) 
Betweenness Centrality 25.68* 
(10.78) 
Facebook Use .21* 
(.09) 


















Academic Year .13* 
(.06) 







McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 .10 
N 1307 
Note. Entries are ordinal logistic regression 
coefficients; SE in parentheses; +p < .10, 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
  




Table 3. Discussion-Stimulating Facebook Practices 































































































































































































































































































































































































LR 184.87 103.88 122.77 69.41 66.23 50.91 56.67 90.88 77.84 107.30 105.58 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 .19 .08 .09 .09 .09 .06 .07 .06 .11 .08 .19 
N 1307 1307 1307 428 428 428 428 1307 753 1307 1307 
Note. Entries are logistic or ordinal logistic coefficients; SE in parentheses; +p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 




Table 4. Predicted Probabilities of Facebook Political Discussion Practices by Centrality Type 
Practice Centrality 𝒙 − 𝟏𝑺𝑫 𝒙 𝒙 + 𝟏𝑺𝑫 Δ 
Self-Disclosure      
Like Candidate Page Indegree .10 .06 .02 -.08 
 Betweenness .02 .07 .11 +.09 
Post Political Views Betweenness .37 .47 .56 +.19 
Post Political Updates Betweenness .38 .60 .79 +.41 
Safe Discussion      
Comfort: Disagree3 Indegree .36 .44 .54 +.18 
Comfort: Unsure4 Indegree .37 .49 .62 +.25 
Partner Closeness5 Indegree .47 .58 .68 +.21 
Partner Opinions6 Indegree .34 .43 .56 +.22 
Targeted Disclosure      
Block Parts of Profile Indegree .07 .17 .25 +.18 
Block Specific Updates Indegree .14 .23 .34 +.20 
Attempted Persuasion      
Like Pages to Influence Betweenness .25 .32 .41 +.16 
Post GOTV Message Betweenness .02 .07 .15 +.13 
Constructive Responses      
Update Reaction7 Indegree .27 .36 .44 +.17 
Link Reaction8 Indegree .03 .10 .18 +.15 
Visit Page Indegree .41 .50 .57 +.16 
Destructive Responses      
Hide: Volume Indegree .24 .17 .11 -.13 
 Betweenness .28 .20 .12 -.16 
Hide: Disagree Indegree .32 .25 .18 -.14 
 Betweenness .33 .25 .20 -.13 
Unfriend: Volume Indegree .32 .24 .18 -.14 
 Betweenness .29 .21 .12 -.17 
Unfriend: Disagree Indegree .33 .24 .15 -.18 
 Betweenness .33 .22 .12 -.21 
 
  
                                                          
3 Cumulative probability of uncomfortable and very uncomfortable 
4 Cumulative probability of uncomfortable and very uncomfortable 
5 Pr (discuss politics mainly with family and close friends) 
6 Pr (discuss politics mainly with those who “generally agree with me”) 
7 Pr (read and either comment on or like posts) 





Figure 1. Examples of Centrality Effects on Discussion-Stimulating Facebook Practices 
 
A. Indegree Centrality and Targeted Disclosure 
 
 

























































Table 5. Facebook Political Discussion Response Practices 















































































































































































































































LR 105.58 108.45 95.67 110.56 104.09 106.11 107.98 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 .08 .08 .07 .08 .08 .08 .08 
N 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 
Note. Entries are logistic or ordinal logistic coefficients; SE in parentheses; +p < .1, *p < .05, **p 






Table 6. Summary of Findings 
Dependent Variable Hypothesis Posited Relationship Results 
Political Discussion 
Frequency 
1a Indegree + Supported 
 1b Betweenness + Supported 
Online Political Disclosure 2a Indegree – Partially supported 
 2b Betweenness + Supported 
Safe Discussion 3a Indegree + Supported 
 3b Betweenness – Not supported 
Targeted Disclosure 4a Indegree + Supported 
 4b Betweenness – Not supported 
Attempting Persuasion 5a Indegree – Not supported 
 5b Betweenness + Supported 
Constructive Responses 6a Indegree + Supported 
 6b Betweenness + Not supported 
Destructive Responses 7a Indegree – Supported 


































1 Means tests showed no difference between respondents and nonrespondents on academic year, 
sex, centrality, or turnout propensity, suggesting that our results were not an artifact of response 
bias. The propensity similarity suggests that psychological factors correlated with turnout 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), though unmeasured for nonrespondents, did not bias our results. 
2 AAPOR (2011) recommends calculating participation rates in non-probability web samples as 
the proportion of contacted units providing “usable” responses (p. 38). We defined a usable 
response as one where the name generator was completed.  
3 We used unstandardized indegree centrality since it is easily interpreted as friend count. But 
analysts often use standardized betweenness to compress its large raw scores (Prell 2012). 
4 Betweenness scores are generally small in survey data of large networks (Prell 2012), yet still 
capture meaningful centrality variance and provide explanatory power in statistical models. 
5 Nonresponse can bias centrality scores, especially betweenness, but is less problematic in large 
networks (Borgatti et al. 2013). We conducted two robustness checks supplementing the name 
generator data with objective roommate and hallmate ties. These checks yielded new indegree 
and betweenness variants that strongly correlated with the versions reported here and that 
produced similar statistical results in models, suggesting that our results are not an artifact of 
nonresponse bias. Our reported models used centralities based solely on the name generator. 
6 In the Table 5 models, we modeled interactions between the two centrality variants and both 
discussion partner closeness and discussion partner opinion. None of those interactions yielded 
statistically significant moderating effects. This reinforces the notion that the two centrality 
variants are uniquely related to differential discussion practices as those effects were not 







7 Number of Facebook friends was trimmed from the final models given its lack of both import 
to our theory and statistical significance across our models when included as an independent 
variable. Importantly, number of Facebook friends is conceptually distinct from indegree 
centrality; the former is a self-reported count of connections, while the latter is a measure of 
popularity in a network as reported by others.  
